Since 9/11, the United States implemented radical changes to its counterterrorism strategy and capabilities. Recently, critics have called into question the current strategy for fighting a war on terror. This thesis provides a summary of the two most common competing criticisms of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. On the one hand, critics argue that the threat has been exaggerated. On the opposite side of the spectrum, critics argue that we are engaged in a war between Islam and the West. An examination of the evidence used by these competing criticisms, combined with a review of existing U.S. strategies, provides a foundation for the construction of an appropriate response to terrorism. This review reveals evidence that the threat should be evaluated differently for domestic and international counterterrorist threats. Internationally, the U.S. engaged in a battle with a radical Islamic insurgency. Domestically, the terrorist threat is made up of terrorist operators who are engaged in a wide variety of criminal activity. Although the U.S. is unprepared for the external threat posed by radical Islamic insurgents, the post--9/11 enhancements to homeland security are appropriate to meet the current domestic threat.

Subjects: Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Terrorism; Prevention; Islamic fundamentalism; United States; Strategy